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Abstract	
Swann	v.	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Board	of	Education	changed	the	way	the	united	states	thought	about	segregation.	It	charged	the	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools	system	(CMS)	with	using	busing	to	redistribute	students	across	the	district	in	order	to	eliminate	all	vestiges	of	the	segregated,	dual-race	school	system.		The	apparent	success	of	CMS’	busing	plan	helped	situate	Charlotte	as	a	progressive	city	of	the	New	South.	The	end	of	court-ordered	desegregation	led	to	a	stark	reversion	to	racially	distinct	and	unequal	schools	that	look	very	similar	to	those	before	Swann.	Recent	research	into	the	segregation	of	the	housing	market	in	Mecklenburg	County	complements	the	scholarship	of	Derrick	Bell	and	Stephen	Smith,	explaining	how	Whites	have	continued	to	leverage	public	policy	and	private	development	to	maintain	what	George	Lipsitz	calls	the	White	Spatial	Imaginary.			 	
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Figure	1.	Population	by	Race/Ethnicity	in	Mecklenburg	County,	2010	decennial	census.		Nelson,	Mickelson,	and	Smith	2	(2015).		
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	Introduction	The	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools	(CMS)	system	gained	national	recognition	and	regional	prominence	for	its	apparently	successful	desegregated	school	system.	From	1969	to	2002,	the	city	operated	under	a	program	of	mandatory	busing	for	racial	balance.	Know	affectionately	as	the	“City	that	made	it	work,”	Charlotte,	and	surrounding	Mecklenburg	County,	grew	rapidly	in	the	latter	third	of	the	20th	century,	in	no	small	part	due	to	the	public	success	of	its	race-based	desegregated	busing	program.	After	a	federal	judge	declared	the	system	“unified”	and	released	it	from	supervision,	the	district	quickly	reverted	to	segregation	levels	approaching	those	found	in	the	1950s.	This	paper	will	explain	how	this	happened,	why	it	happened	so	fast,	and	what	it	may	mean	for	CMS.	After	a	brief	summary	of	the	major	school	desegregation	court	cases	which	are	most	pertinent	to	this	study,	I	draw	heavily	on	Davison	Douglas’	work,	Reading,	Writing,	and	
Race:	School	Desegregation	in	Charlotte,	NC	to	establish	a	brief	history	of	race	and	public	education	in	North	Carolina.	I	then	discuss	the	seminal	desegregation	case	Swann	v.	CMS	and	review	demographic	changes	and	policy	decision	in	Mecklenburg	County	reflect	a	continuation	of	historical	responses	by	empowered	Whites	to	calls	for	racial	equity	in	education.	They	apparently	acquiesce,	but	only	insofar	as	that	such	action	does	not	challenge	their	claims	to	Whiteness.			 	
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Literature	Review	A	timeline	of	select	Supreme	Court	Desegregation	Cases:	The	following	is	of	an	overview	of	the	school	desegregation	cases	that	are	most	pertinent	to	this	analysis.		
• 1954	-	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education	I:	segregated	schools,	even	if	“equal”	in	all	tangible	factors,	deprive	minority	students	of	equal	education,	violating	the	14th	Amendment.	Abolished	legal	school	segregation	and	the	separate	but	equal	doctrine	(Brown).	
• 1955	-	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education	II:	directed	the	states	to	execute	the	court’s	segregation	order	with	“All	deliberate	speed”	(Brown	II)	
• 1961	–	Morrow	v.	Mecklenburg	County	Board	of	Education:	The	1960	pupil	assignment	plan	of	geographic	assignment	with	opportunity	to	petition	for	transfer	was	sufficiently	desegregated	(Morrow)	
• 1968	-	Green	v.	New	Kent	County	Commissioners:	Legal	segregation	must	be	dug	out,	root	and	branch.	Establishes	six	“Green	factors”	by	which	a	desegregation	case	should	be	judged:	(Green)	
o Student	assignment,		
o Faculty	assignment,		
o Staff	assignment,		
o Transportation,		
o Extracurricular	activities,	
o Facilities		
• 1971	-	Swann	v	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Board	of	Education:		
o A	court-ordered	system	of	busing	to	desegregate	schools	towards	a	baseline	mathematical	ratio	of	White	and	Black	students	is	within	the	power	of	the	district	court	for	instances	in	which	the	local	school	board	has	not	come	
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forward	with	a	sufficient	plan	for	dismantling	the	effects	of	a	state-run	dual	system	(Swann).	
• 2000	-	Belk	v	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Board	of	Education	
o Belk	argued	that	a	new	case,	Capacchione	v	CMS,	was	an	assault	on	Swann,	and	moved	to	reopen	the	Swann	case.	In	2001	a	federal	district	judge	declared	the	school	system	unitary	and	removed	it	from	its	court	mandate	to	bus	students	for	racial	equilibrium	within	the	school	system	(Belk).		 	
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	Literature	Review	In	contemporary	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools	(CMS),	White	students	have	become	a	statistical	minority.	However,	they	still	benefit	from	a	school	system	built	to	accommodate	their	needs.	As	Bell	(1980)	asserts,	Whites	will	only	serve	Black	and	other	minority	interests	if	their	interests	are	aligned.	Steve	Smith’s	Boom	For	Whom	evaluates	this	theorem	in	the	context	of	CMS	and	desegregation	up	until	2004.	This	paper	attempts	to	refocus	that	narrative	onto	the	nature	by	which	White	actors	prioritize	their	interests,	and	briefly	explores	what	has	happened	in	CMS	since	2004.		Lipsitz	(2011)	suggests	the	White	spatial	imaginary	views	space	as	a	means	to	generate	exchange	value,	investing	in	real	estate	and	benefiting	from	advantages	like	superior	schools.	“Whiteness,”	he	writes,	“is	structured	advantage	subsidized	by	segregation.	It	is	not	so	much	color	as	it	is	condition”	(Lipsitz,	37).	The	condition	of	Whiteness	is	that	condition	of	structured	advantage.	Importantly,	to	those	who	benefit	from	the	advantages	of	Whiteness,	the	benefits	are	not	seen	as	advantages	accrued	by	Whiteness,	but	rather	as	the	absence	of	the	disadvantages	(and,	in	some	imaginaries,	fearsomeness)	attributed	to	being	non-White,	requiring	“the	construction	of	a	devalued	and	even	demonized	Blackness	to	be	credible	and	legitimate”	(Lipsitz,	37).	In	many	large	urban	areas	in	the	U.S.,	fragmented	school	districts	have	allowed	Whites	to	maintain	their	structural	advantage	post-desegregation	by	providing	an	opportunity	for	racial	and	economic	consolidation	between	school	districts.	In	post-desegregation	in	CMS,	however,	the	countywide	extent	of	the	district	has	meant	that	Whites	are	not	able	to	migrate	to	wealthier,	White,	suburban	school	districts.	This	paper	will	evaluate	some	of	the	other	
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ways	in	which	the	White	population	in	Mecklenburg	County	has	asserted	itself	in	order	to	maintain	their	hold	on	Whiteness.		As	a	nationally	prominent	example	of	court-ordered	desegregative	bussing,	the	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools	case	has	received	scholarly	attention	from	several	different	fields	and	perspectives.	In	this	paper,	I	will	focus	on	the	analysis	by	Stephen	Samuel	Smith,	relying	on	Derrick	Bell’s	interest-convergence	dilemma,	of	the	political	and	economic	factors	that	drove	Charlotte’s	business	elite	to	support	desegregation,	and	how	those	same	factors	now	contribute	to	the	resegregation	of	CMS.		I	rely	throughout	on	works	from	two	collections,	Yesterday,	Today	and	Tomorrow:	
School	Desegregation	and	Resegregation	in	Charlotte	(eds	Mickelson,	Smith,	and	Nelson,	2015),	and	School	Resegregation:	Must	the	South	Turn	Back?	(eds.	Boger	&	Orfield,	2005)		to	inform	and	contextualize	the	recent	history	and	current	realities	and	challenges	facing	cities	like	Charlotte.	The	forced	desegregation	of	public	schools	in	the	United	States	in	the	20th	century	is	intimately	tied	to	the	courts	and	to	public	and	juridical	sentiment	and	understandings	of	racism	and	structural	inequality.	But	both	public	and	judicial	opinions	on	segregation	are	inextricably	tied	to	the	development	of	the	US	city	in	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	century.	An	understanding	of	that	development	is	fundamental	to	understanding	desegregation	and	resegregation	within	the	US	city	because	of	the	strong	historic	linkage	between	residential	segregation	and	school	segregation.		Charlotte	represents	this	development	in	a	distinct	manner,	as	a	southern,	“New	South”	city	that	experienced	tremendous	population	growth,	in	the	last	quarter	of	the	
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twentieth	century	and	the	first	decade	of	the	twenty-first,	newcomers	arriving	not	only	from	nearby	rural	areas	but	from	northern	cities	and	foreign	countries.		Ample	studies	demonstrate	the	negative	impact	on	students	caused	by	the	end	to	active	racial	desegregation.	Crime	rates	rose	amongst	non-White	males	(Billings,	Deming,	Rockoff,	2013).		All	students	score	lower	when	assigned	to	schools	with	more	minority	students	(Billings,	Deming,	Rockoff,	2013).	The	urban	centers	of	the	US,	including	Charlotte,	are	becoming	minority	white,	and	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Schools	is	now	32%	white,	compared	with	79%	white	in	1969	(Frey,	2011).		However,	being	a	consolidated,	countywide	district,	CMS’	school	administration	and	assignment	does	not	follow	the	pattern	of	many	other	large	municipalities,	(Hanchett;	Liebowitz	&	Page;	Billings,	Demming,	and	Rockoff,	2014;	Billings	Brunner,	and	Ross,	2014;	Tannenbaum,	2015).	Billings,	Brunner,	&	Ross	(2014)	show,	in	Charlotte,	that	in	some	instances	negative	school	evaluations	boost	home	values	in	wealthy	in-zone	enclaves;	Billings	is	able	to	suggest	that	home	prices	rise	because	of	the	significantly	increased	likelihood	that	students	living	within	the	zone	will	be	able	to	successfully	petition	to	leave	their	home	district	for	another,	more	reputable	school.	Liebowitz	and	Page	(2014)	anchor	their	analysis	of	whether	school	policy	in	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	affects	housing	choices	in	the	unique	nature	of	CMS	–	unlike	most	large	metropolitan	areas,	one	district	serves	all	students	within	Charlotte	and	the	greater	Mecklenburg	County.	This,	they	reason,	suggests	that	the	school	administrative	conditions	within	Charlotte,	unlike	most	other	large	cities,	provide	a	great	opportunity	to	create	
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racially	integrated	schools	and	communities	without	a	protracted	or	intractable	political	fight	over	school	district	boundaries	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	674).		The	authors	show,	however,	that	CMS’	neighborhood	school	plan,	adopted	in	2005	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	673),	created	conditions	similar	to	those	present	in	cities	with	multiple	school	districts.	White	families	with	children	enrolled	in	CMS,	they	found,	were	more	likely	under	the	neighborhood	school	scheme	to	move	to	predominately	White	neighborhoods	than	they	had	been	during	the	administration	of	CMS’	race-conscious	desegregation	plans,	from	1971-2002.	Liebowitz	and	Page	argue	that,	given	the	litany	of	factors	affecting	individual	housing	choices,	differentiating	between	de	jure	and	de	facto	segregation	is	quite	difficult.	They	go	so	far	as	to	suggest	that,	in	light	of	their	research,	the	courts	might	reevaluate	their	series	of	decisions	in	the	1990’s	and	2000’s	granting	many	school	districts	unitary	status	(699).		Armor,	Thernstrom,	&	Thernstrom	(2006)	contest	that	existing	research	has	been	able	to	fully	control	for	the	immediate	effects	of	racial	segregation,	but	Mickelson	(2008)	dismisses	their	work	as	dated,	drawing	on	a	limited	number	of	studies	small	in	scope,	from	the	1970’s	and	1980’s.	Derrick	A.	Bell,	Jr.	writes	a	commentary	on	the	success	and	failure	of	the	juridical	logics	used	in	Brown	v	Board	of	Education	and	other	school	desegregation	litigation.	He	writes	commentary	the	ties	together	judicial	and	popular	opinion.	That	alone	is	exceedingly	helpful	for	understanding	the	brief	journey	from	court-ordered	desegregation	to	court-determined	“unitary	status,”	but	Bell’s	piece	goes	further.	Though	first	delivered	as	a	speech	in	1978,	his	idea	of	the	“interest-convergence	dilemma”	appears	again	in	the	
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relevant	work	of	Steve	Smith,	and	with	him,	Amy	Hawn	Nelson	and	Roslyn	Mickelson.	Bell’s	commentary	is	very	useful	in	judging	how	the	courts’	opinions	evolved	from	1954-2002,	and	why.	The	interest-convergence	theory	proposes	that	the	seminal	school	desegregation	decisions	from	Brown	to	Swann	were	not	striking	stances	by	the	courts	that	pushed	the	middle	and	upper-class	Whites	in	the	U.S.	to	delay	their	interests	for	the	benefit	of	Black	interests,	but	rather	that	the	cases	demonstrated	a	narrow	window	of	convergence	between	White	and	Black	interests.	Smith	expands	on	this	idea,	suggesting,	as	Bell	does,	that	White	economic	and	political	interests	of	the	time	supported	desegregation,	even	if	the	immediate	results	of	such	a	policy	change	were	personally	distasteful.	Desegregation	benefited	the	US’	foreign	policy,	particularly	as	it	competed	in	the	“third	world”	against	the	egalitarian	ethos	of	the	USSR.	It	also	improved	the	economic	conditions	in	the	US,	particularly	in	the	South,	consolidating	facilities	and	making	the	region	more	attractive	to	national	and	international	business	and	industry.		Bell	(1980)	suggests	that	the	window	of	rousing	Civil	Rights	litigation	has	closed,	at	least	in	the	realm	of	school	desegregation	–	and	he	briefly	outlines	an	alternative.	He	recommends	that	energies	be	focused	not	on	integration	but	on	improving	existing	schools	for	all	students,	including	integrated	and	all-Black	schools,	in	a	clear	counter-proposal	to	the	ideology	of	most	of	the	other	authors	–	particularly	of	Hawn	Nelson,	Smith,	and	Mickelson	–	that	integrated	schools	are	a	key	goal.		Bell	argues	that	the	primary	goal	when	discussing	desegregation	should	be	“effective	schools,”	not	desegregated	schools.	He	expresses	considerable	skepticism	of	the	ultimate	effectiveness	of	desegregated	schools	at	addressing	Black	students’	needs.	Three	and	one	half	decades	after	he	wrote,	there	is	considerably	more	data	on	the	issue	and,	as	
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Mickelson	(2005)	and	Nelson	(2015)	demonstrate,	students	of	color	attending	desegregated	schools	do	perform	better	than	their	peers	attending	hypersegregated	schools	of	color.	Still,	evidence	(Mickelson,	2005)	shows	that	tracking	within	schools	fosters	a	still-segregated	environment	and	perpetuates	racial	achievement	gaps.	Of	these	concerns,	Bell’s	argument	raises	interesting	concerns	about	the	efficacy	of	Swann’s	addressing	of	segregation.	Unfortunately,	these	concerns	fall	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.		Davison	Douglas’	encyclopedic	work,	Reading,	Writing	&	Race:	The	Desegregation	of	
the	Charlotte	Schools	(1995)	provides	a	peerless	summary	of	the	political	and	social	developments	that	led	to	and	marked	the	desegregation	project	in	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools.	In	the	following	section,	the	prelude	to	his	argument	is	summarized	in	depth,	not	to	repeat	his	scholarship,	but	to	reframe	his	research	in	light	of	Bell’s	interest	convergence	dilemma,	emphasizing	how	White	players	in	North	Carolina	business	and	politics	have	acted	to	maintain	their	status	as	White,	and	differentiated	from	non-White.		The	Politics	of	Public	Education	in	North	Carolina,	1839-1956	North	Carolina	has	never	abandoned	its	public	schools.	In	1954,	after	the	Supreme	Court	handed	down	their	unanimous	ruling	Brown	v	Topeka	Kansas	Board	of	education	ruling,	declaring	that	racially	segregated,	“separate	but	equal”	facilities	and	accommodations	were	unconstitutional	and	must	be	desegregated,	rather	than	desegregate,	South	Carolina,	Alabama,	Georgia	and	Mississippi	abandoned	their	state	commitments	to	public	education.	North	Carolina	stood	firm,	determined	to	build	upon	its	
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reputation	as	a	moderate	southern	state,	governed	by	reasonable,	White	businessmen	willing	to,	when	it	came	to	race,	make	it	work.	In	1868,	on	the	heels	of	the	14th	amendment,	(which	would	later	form	the	backbone	of	nearly	every	single	lawsuit	which	challenged	segregated	schooling)	a	new	constitution	for	the	State	of	North	Carolina	promised	a	free,	public	education	for	all	students	(Douglas,	7).	Tucked	into	that	new,	post-slavery,	post-war	framework	of	government	was	a	non-binding	resolution	supporting	racially	separate	schools,	proposed	by	a	newly	elected	Black	legislator.	The	following	year,	Black	legislators	voted	alongside	their	White	peers	as	the	state	passed	an	amendment	mandating	racial	segregated	primary	and	secondary	schools.	The	Black	politicians	voted	for	segregation	in	an	effort	to	secure	the	establishment	and	perpetuation	of	Black	schools	from	the	primary	to	collegiate	level.		In	the	latter	part	of	the	19th	century,	North	Carolina	politics	were	marked	by	the	success	of	the	Fusion	Alliance,	a	coalition	of	Black	and	White	Republicans	and	Populists,	who	dominated	state	politics,	running	a	modestly	progressive	government	that	–generally–	supported	public	education	for	Black	students	in	North	Carolina	(Douglas,	14).	While	Blacks	held	modest	political	power	in	the	state	legislature,	the	Black	political	leadership	hoped	that	by	supporting	segregated	schools	they	would	maintain	the	general	support	of	White	politicians	for	Black	public	education	and	other	civic	needs	(Douglas,	7).		This	conciliatory	tactic,	challenged	from	within	and	without,	became	a	foundational	piece	of	North	Carolina’s	attitude	towards	race	and	public	education.		From	the	end	of	slavery	up	until	the	1940’s,	legal	battles	over	segregated	schools	tended,	ironically,	perhaps,	to	take	the	form	of	White	parents	concerned	that	they	might	
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have	to	pay	more	for	their	children’s	superior	education	than	Black	families	did	for	their	children’s	education.	In	1886,	a	group	of	White	families	challenged	a	law	that	divided	tax	revenues	for	racially	segregated	schools.	Under	the	statute,	taxes	on	Black	citizens	would	pay	for	Black	schools,	while	taxes	on	White	citizens	paid	for	taxes	on	White	schools.		That	year,	a	group	of	White	taxpayers	brought	a	case	against	the	Gaston	County	Commissioners,	objecting	to	a	planned	tax	increase	to	expand	funding	for	White	schools.	Unhappy	about	the	tax	hike,	they	sued	not	in	support	of	the	underfunded	schools	for	Black	students,	but	in	an	effort	to	challenge	their	new	tax	by	challenging	the	law.	The	resulting	decision,	Pruitt	v.	
Commissioners	of	Gaston	County,	found	that	the	separate	taxation	scheme	unconstitutional,	but	upheld	segregation	so	long	as	it	was	separate	and	equal	–	ten	years	before	the	Plessy	v.	
Ferguson	case	would	make	separate	but	equal	the	law	of	the	land	(United	States,	1898).	Foreshadowing	the	extreme	reactions	that	would	follow	Brown,	Kingston	and	Goldsboro	NC	abandoned	their	public	schools	rather	than	fund	Black	and	White	institutions	from	the	same	tax	monies.	Kingston	and	Goldsboro	quickly	resumed	classes	after	seeing	the	devastating	impact	on	not	just	Black,	but	also	White	children	(Douglas,	11).	Pruitt	was	not	an	outright	victory	for	Black	schools	–	it	enshrined	separate	but	equal	as	state	law	ten	years	before	Plessy	would	do	the	same	in	federal	courts	and	while	it	did	determine	that	Black	and	White	schools	should	be	funded	from	the	same	tax	base,	it	left	disbursement	of	that	money	up	to	the	individual	school	districts,	who	tended	to	spend	more	on	White	students	than	Black	(“United	States,”	633).	Still,	under	the	Fusion	Alliance	government,	Black	schools	remained	relatively	well	funded	compared	to	Black	schools	around	the	country.	At	the	turn	of	the	20th	century,	the	
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state’s	population	was	about	one-third	Black,	and	Black	schools	were	receiving	about	28%	of	state	funding	–	more	than	in	any	other	southern	state,	including	those	with	a	much	larger	Black	population	(Douglas,	14).		The	white-supremacist	Democrats’	defeat	of	the	Fusion	Alliance	in	the	1898	election	brought	the	days	of	educational	near-parity	to	a	sharp	close	(Douglas,	12).	Governor	Charles	B.	Aycock,	one	of	the	first	of	North	Carolina’s	famous	“Education	Governors,”	pushed	through	education	reform	including	an	increased	spending,	from	1	to	4.7	million	dollars.	Though	an	avowed	white	supremacist,	Aycock	championed	the	defeat	of	an	amendment	that	would	have	overturned	the	Pruitt	decision,	allowing	for	the	racial	collection	of	taxes	for	schools.	Aycock	saw	Black	education	as	a	vehicle	for	Whites’	paternal	care	of	Black	North	Carolinians	and	an	economically	important	tool,	one	that	would	increase	the	productivity	of	the	state	and	stem	the	tide	of	Black	emigration	form	Eastern	NC.	Still,	as	spending	went	up	for	the	state,	Blacks’	share	of	the	pie	fell,	from	28%	in	1990	to	17%	in	1910	to	only	13%	in	1915	–	the	state	spending	an	average	of	$7.40	per	White	student,	and	a	$2.30	per	pupil	pittance	on	Black	students.	Some	years,	Black	public	schools	received	more	support	from	northern	foundations	like	the	Rosenwald	Fund	than	from	the	state	(Douglas,	14).			The	1902,	a	group	of	White	taxpayers	again	objected	to	racially	specific	school	funding.	In	Hooker	v	Town	of	Greenville,	a	group	of	White	taxpayers	objected	to	a	series	of	education	bonds	passed	to	benefit	White	schools.	The	court,	strikingly,	enjoined	the	bonds	because	they	would	only	benefit	White	students	(Douglas,	14).	The	state	constitution,	the	jurists	said,	required	per	capita	student	funds	to	be	equal.	Tellingly,	four	of	the	five	judges	who	ruled	on	the	case	had	been	appointed	during	the	more	progressive	Fusion	Alliance	era	
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and	the	new	General	Assembly	moved	to	impeach	two	of	the	judges,	though	the	Senate	failed	to	indict	(Douglas,	15).	Though	not	an	outright	rejection	of	segregation,	Hooker	did,	promisingly,	challenge	the	history	of	inadequate	spending	on	students	of	color.	Three	years	later,	a	new	bench	overruled	Hooker	in	the	case,	Lowery	v	School	
Trustees	of	Kernersville.	The	justices	found	instead	that	the	Constitution	required	not	equal	per	capita	expenditures,	but	simply	“Equal	facilities,”	terms	of	the	“same	length”	and	a	“sufficient	number	of	teachers”	(Douglas,	15).	The	court	offered	broad,	loose	definitions	for	each	of	these	measures,	effectively	ending	any	mandate	of	equal	treatment	by	the	state.	The	Democratic	electoral	return	came	in	lockstep	with	Jim	Crow	segregation	and	open	violence	towards	Black	North	Carolinians.		A	white	electorate	and	segregationist	legislature	chose	the	NC’s	jurists,	providing	few	opportunities	to	challenge	discrimination	through	litigation.	Some	Black	leaders	resisted	efforts	to	pursue	equity	or	integration	through	the	courts.	Continuing	in	the	vein	of	those	who	supported	the	segregated	primary	schools	of	1869,	they	operated	from	an	accommodationist	platform,	working	to	improve	Black	schools	at	the	primary,	secondary	and	university	level	(Douglas,	19).		Improvement	in	educational	parity,	when	it	came,	came	slowly	from	both	the	legislature	and	the	courts.	The	governor’s	1934	“Commission	for	the	Study	of	Problems	in	Negro	Education”	recommended	increased	salaries	for	Black	teachers;	in	1938	Charlotte	4th	Circuit	Judge	John	Parker	found	that	White	teachers’	25-30%	higher	salaries	violated	the	equal	protection	clause	of	the	14th	Amendment.	By	1945,	Black	teachers	actually	made	more	money	than	their	White	counterparts,	although	this	was	partly	a	result	of	discontinuity	between	educational	attainment-based	salaries	and	discriminatorily	higher	standards	for	Black	hires	(Douglas,	20).		
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In	the	1940’s	North	Carolina	continued	to	make	small	adjustments	in	an	attempt	to	appease	their	Black	constituency.	Around	the	country,	Black	interests	were	being	received	with	greater	gravity.	Hoping	to	avoid	litigation	in	Federal	Courts,	the	North	Carolina	Legislature	raised	expenditures	for	Black	students,	Black	teacher	Salaries,	and	expanded	graduate	programs	for	Black	students.	In	doing	so,	ruling	Whites	in	North	Carolina	appeared	to	be	much	more	sympathetic	to	Black	lives	than	were	their	contemporaries	in	other	states,	particularly	their	Southern	neighbors.	In	1939,	then-Governor	Clyde	Hoey	defended	his	support	of	Black	graduate	education,	crystalizing	the	bigoted,	paternal	logic	of	the	day	by	saying	“North	Carolina	does	not	believe	in	social	equity	between	the	races,	and	will	not	tolerate	mixed	schools	for	the	races,	but	we	do	believe	in	equality	of	opportunity	in	their	respective	fields	of	service”	(Douglas,	23).	In	1949,	however,	the	governor’s	North	Carolina	Commission	on	Interacial	Cooperation	dissolved,	citing	disagreements	about	integration.		That	same	year,	Kelly	Alexander,	president	of	the	North	Carolina	National	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Colored	People	(NC	NAACP),	defined	integrated	schools	as	a	final	goal	of	his	organization’s	work		(Douglas,	23).	A	national	consensus	was	building	in	support	of	Black	students,	and	North	Carolina	was	not	to	be	left	behind.	Beginning	in	1949,	with	strong	support	from	the	NAACP	Legal	Defense	Fund,	plaintiffs	filed	several	school	desegregation	suits,	worrying	the	North	Carolina	General	Assembly	(NCGA),	who	decreased	the	per-pupil	funding	gap	between	White	and	Black	students:	in	1940,	White	students	received	79%	more	funding	from	the	state.	By	1952,	that	gap	had	been	closed	to	17%	(Douglas,	22).	Fighting	segregation	in	primary	and	secondary	schools	was	challenging.	Most	of	the	NAACP’s	cases	targeted	institutions	of	higher	education:	colleges	and	graduate	schools.	In	1951,	for	example,	a	federal	court	order	
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integrated	the	UNC	Law	School	(Douglas,	23).	Then,	in	1954	the	Supreme	Court	released	a	unanimous	9-0	verdict	on	a	group	of	cases,	including	one	from	Clarendon	South	Carolina,	a	few	hours	to	the	south	of	Charlotte.	The	cases	were	collectively	called	Brown	v.	Topeka	
Kansas	Board	of	Education.	In	their	opinion	the	justices	concluded	“that,	in	the	field	of	public	education,	the	doctrine	of	"separate	but	equal"	has	no	place.	Separate	educational	facilities	are	inherently	unequal	(Brown).”		 The	Brown	case	was	simple,	striking	in	its	clarity,	and	fundamentally	changed	the	United	States.	Before	Brown,	the	Supreme	Court	had	ruled	that	segregation	of	graduate-level	institutions	was	unconstitutional	because	it	hindered	students’	“ability	to	study,	to	engage	in	discussion	and	exchange	views	with	other	students,	and,	in	general,	to	learn	his	profession”	(Swann).		In	Brown,	the	court	found	that	“Such	considerations	apply	with	added	force	to	children	in	grade	and	high	schools.	To	separate	them	from	others	of	similar	age	and	qualifications	solely	because	of	their	race	generates	a	feeling	of	inferiority	as	to	their	status	in	the	community	that	may	affect	their	hearts	and	minds	in	a	way	unlikely	to	be	undone”	(Swann).	The	justices	were	writing	a	full	decade	before	the	Civil	Rights	Act	prevented	federal	discrimination	by	race.	The	justices	simply	found	that	it	was	harmful	to	segregate	students	on	race	and	doing	so	would	hinder	the	students	for	their	entire	lives.	That,	under	the	equal	protection	clause	of	the	14th	Amendment,	was	unconstitutional	(Brown).	States	around	the	country	appealed,	requesting	relief,	reconsideration,	and	further	instruction.		In	North	Carolina,	Governor	Umstead	requested	a	report	from	the	UNC	Institute	of	Government	detailing	what	the	ruling	meant	for	North	Carolina	and	how	the	state	should	
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proceed.	Published	in	August	of	1954,	the	authors	suggested	the	state	not	defy	the	Courts’	desegregation	orders,	as	many	states	were	preparing	to	do.	Private	tuition	grants,	the	report	cautioned,	for	white	families	hoping	to	avoid	a	desegregated	learning	environment,	might	be	unconstitutional.	The	authors	also	panned	the	idea	of	a	state-sponsored	private	school	system.	Desegregation	in	North	Carolina	would	take	a	long	time.	Better,	they	said,	to	wait	it	out	and	take	no	drastic	action	until	the	court	clarified	their	ruling	on	Brown	(Douglas,	28).	Shortly	after	the	Brown	ruling,	the	Supreme	Court	received	several	“requests	for	relief”	in	the	task	of	desegregating	their	schools	–	ranging	from	“how”	to	“how	soon”	to	“must	we	at	all?”		The	NC	Attorney	General’s	office	submitted	its	own	amicus	(friend	of	the	court)	brief.	Written	in	large	part	by	Assistant	Attorney	General	and	white	supremacist	Beverly	Lake,	it	advised	the	courts	that	desegregation	was	simply	not	possible.	Lake	supported	his	argument	with	a	survey	of	Law	Enforcement	and	school	Superintendents,	which	earnestly	reported	that	desegregation	would	likely	cause	unconscionable	violence	and	disruption	and,	perhaps,	the	eventual	abandonment	of	public	schools	(Douglas,	29).	Complementing	the	Institute	of	Government	report	commissioned	by	the	Governor’s	office,	in	1954	the	legislature	convened	and	Advisory	Committee	on	Education,	a	19-man	(16	White,	3	Black)	committee	tasked,	under	the	leadership	of	House	Speaker	Thomas	J	Pearsall,	with	studying	desegregation.	The	committee	unanimously	recommended	that	“the	mixing	of	the	races	forthwith	in	the	public	schools	throughout	the	state”	was	impossible,	and	“should	not	be	attempted.”	It	would,	the	members	found,	“alienate	public	support	of	the	schools	to	such	an	extent	that	they	could	not	be	operated	successfully.’”	(Douglas	30).	
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In	North	Carolina,	the	Committee	found,	the	Brown	decision	was	hugely	unpopular	among	Whites,	and	also	among	Blacks.	Across	the	South,	47%	of	Black	Americans	the	Brown	decision	–	in	large	part	due	to	fears	that	white	students	would	hurt	their	children	(Douglas,	30).	As	with	the	establishment	of	segregate	schools	and	steps	towards	funding	parity,	threats	and	acts	of	violence	by	Whites	against	Blacks	curbed	Black	enthusiasm	for	the	change.	On	the	surface,	North	Carolina	appeared	to	wait	to	receive	notice	from	the	second	ruling	on	Brown.	In	reality,	what	would	become	the	state’s	strategy	towards	school	desegregation	–	external	acceptance,	internal	resistance	–	was	already	taking	shape.	At	the	state	level,	on	March	30,	1955	the	legislature	vested	local	school	boards	with	school	assignment	authority	(Douglas,	31).	These	new	arbiters	were	directed	to	not	consider	race	in	their	assignment	choices;	complainants	were	directed	through	a	labyrinthine	appeals	process.	This	action	moved	the	onus	of	desegregation	from	the	state	to	municipal	governments,	at	once	relieving	the	state	of	any	pressure	to	address	school,	and	stalling	the	process	of	compelling	integration	through	the	courts:	the	structure	of	the	new	law	meant	that	any	case	brought	against	a	school	system	in	North	Carolina	would	affect	only	that	system,	and	not	the	entire	state.		In	coordination	with	Governor	Hodges,	who	in	November	of	1954	succeeded	the	late	Governor	Umstead,	the	General	Assembly	did	not	(as	had	their	colleagues	in	South	Carolina	and	Virginia)	pass	a	constitutional	amendment	abolishing	public	schools,	providing	tuition	grants	to	parents	who	wished	to	enroll	their	children	in	private	schools.	Nor	did	they	pass	legislation	that	would	have	denied	state	funding	to	any	district	that	permitted	desegregation	(Douglas,	32).	
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Instead,	in	1956,	a	second	Pearsall	Committee,	this	one	composed	of	seven	White	men	–	Black	men,	Governor	Hodges	reasoned,	being	too	likely	to	push	for	immediate	desegregation	–	reported	that	“The	educational	system	of	North	Carolina	has	been	built	on	the	foundation	stone	of	segregation	of	the	races	in	the	schools…The	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	destroyed	the	school	system	which	we	had	developed	–	a	segregated-by-law	system…[The	Committee	is]	proposing	the	building	of	a	new	school	system	on	a	new	foundation	–	a	foundation	of	no	racial	segregation	by	law,	but	assignment	according	to	natural	racial	preference	and	the	administrative	determination	of	what	is	best	for	the	child”	(Douglas,	32).	The	legislature	supported	the	commission’s	plan	which	included,	in	a	reversal	from	the	1955	session,	constitutional	referenda	providing	private	school	tuition	grants	for	parents	whose	children	were	assigned	to	a	desegregated	school,	and	for	a	local	referenda	option	which	would	allow	a	community	to	vote	to	close	a	desegregated	school.		While	this	may	seem	to	be	a	great	departure	from	the	state’s	previous	position	–	indeed,	as	a	point	of	policy,	it	certainly	was	–	North	Carolina,	in	passing	the	Pearsall	Plan,	stayed	the	course	with	its	business-conscious	strategy,	taking	a	“moderate”	response	to	the	Brown	decision.	In	situating	the	White	political	response	to	Brown	and	the	growing	momentum	of	the	Civil	Rights	movement,	it	is	important	to	recognize	the	level	to	which,	following	Brown,	White	threats	and	acts	of	physical	violence	were	accompanied	by	structural	violence	of	laws	and	policy	enacted	not	only	by	citizens	and	community	organizations,	but	also	by	local	and	state	governments.		Confronted	with	the	Brown	decision,	North	Carolina	did	not	join	South	Carolina,	Alabama,	Georgia	and	Mississippi	in	abandoning	their	constitutional	provision	for	public	education,	lest	they	be	required	to	equitably	school	Black	children.	
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North	Carolina	did	not	join	South	Carolina,	Georgia,	Louisiana	and	Virginia	in	legislating	to	eliminate	funding	from	schools	that	chose	to	follow	the	Supreme	Court’s	order	and	desegregate.		Nor	did	North	Carolina	did	not	join	Alabama,	Arkansas,	Florida,	Georgia,	Louisiana,	Mississippi,	South	Carolina	and	Virginia	in	passing	“interposition	resolutions,”	declaring	themselves	that	all	or	part	of	the	Brown	decisions	were	unconstitutional	(Douglas,	33).		North	Carolina	did	not	join	Alabama,	Arkansas,	Florida,	Geogria,	Louisiana,	Mississippi,	South	Carolina,	Tennessee,	Texas	and	Virginia	in	passing	legislation	to	limit	the	NAACP	(Douglas,	33).		Unique	of	all	these	southern	states,	North	Carolina	did	not	challenge	the	Court	in	a	strong,	public	fashion.	“Indeed”	notes	Douglas,	“the	North	Carolina	General	Assembly	enacted	fewer	statutes	and	promulgated	fewer	resolutions	in	response	to	Brown	during	the	1950’s	than	did	any	other	southern	state	legislature”	(Douglas,	33).		The	Pearsall	Plan	appeased	White	North	Carolinians	who	opposed	desegregation,	allowing	White	segregationists	to	feel	that	the	state	was	standing	up	to	the	Federal	Government.	But,	by	appearing	comparatively	moderate	alongside	the	virulent	reactions	of	other	southern	states,	it	drew	less	immediate	attention	from	the	Federal	Government,	giving	North	Carolina	the	national	reputation	of	being	a	reasonable	state	(Douglas,	34).	As	open	defiance	grew,	North	Carolina	stayed	the	course	of	quiet,	public	complicity.		Charlotte	and	Mecklenburg	County	epitomized	this	quiet	course	of	(re)action.	In	1956,	the	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Council	on	Human	Relations	circulated	a	speech	warning	of	the	economic	consequences	of	resistance	to	desegregation.	Written	by	the	executive	vice-president	of	the	Baton	Rouge	Chamber	of	Commerce,	Mecklenburg	County	political	
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leadership	found	it	an	apt	response	to	current	politics.	The	speech	derided	resistance	to	
Brown,	foretelling	“Boycotts,	economic	reprisals,	the	possibility	of	abandoning	our	public	schools,	incidence	of	violence,	irresponsible	statements	–	these	are	new	factors	which	will	now	be	given	consideration	by	industry	and	business	when	they	move	to	a	Southern	location”	(Douglas,	38).	In	November	of	1956,	2	months	after	the	Pearsall	Plan	passed	the	General	Assembly,	William	Joyner,	the	vice-president	of	the	committee,	addressed	the	NC	State	Bar.	Calling	himself	a	“man	in	the	middle,”	he	warned	that	overt	resistance	to	all	desegregation	would	lead	to	the	end	of	public	education	or	to	court-ordered	integration.	He	found	both	options	unacceptable,	saying:	“Some	mixing	in	some	of	our	schools	in	inevitable	and	must	occur…it	is	a	small	price	to	pay	for	the	ability	to	keep	the	mixing	within	the	bounds	of	reasonable	control.”	(Douglas,	39).		Leading	the	way	for	North	Carolina,	this	was	the	course	of	action	Mecklenburg	County	would	take.	Local	demography	shaped	North	Carolina’s	political	response	to	the	end	of	educational	segregation.	The	state	had	no	sizeable,	rural,	elite	planter	political	class;	the	political	elite	was	from	the	piedmont,	wealthy	from	new	growth	in	business	and	finance.	In	many	Southern	states,	powerful	White	politicians	traced	their	power	back	to	antebellum	wealth,	and	lived	in	political	fear	of	the	Black	populations	in	their	districts.	In	North	Carolina,	slavery	had	left	no	such	political	legacy;	the	White	political	elites	who	came	from	white-majority	districts	in	the	central,	industrial	part	of	the	state	and	had	little	concern	for	rural,	Black	constituencies	down	east	in	the	agricultural	hearth	of	the	state.	Out	of	sight	and	out	of	mind,	urban	Whites	from	Charlotte	and	Raleigh	held	few	nightmares	of	imminent	
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Black	domination	(as	did	their	peers	in	other	states),	and	so	were	less	concerned	by	the	courts’	orders	of	desegregation	(Douglas,	43).		This	demographic	supremacy	made	possible	the	eventual	acceptance	and	relative	embrace	of	desegregation	across	North	Carolina.	Mecklenburg	County,	the	heart	of	new	commerce	in	NC	seemed	to	embrace	the	Swann	decision	after	some	time.	By	2015,	however,	whites	were	no	longer	a	majority	in	Mecklenburg	County.	Tremendous	growth	in	non-White	population	in	the	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	of	the	twenty-first	century	would	see	the	rapid	retreat	of	White	acquiescence	to	non-White	needs	and	demands.	Whites	in	North	Carolina	might,	as	before,	have	resigned	themselves	to	adjusting	their	world	to	accommodate	for	the	lives	of	others,	but	only	if	promised	the	general	maintenance	of	their	world.			 	
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Mecklenburg	Under	Court	Order	(1969-2001)	
Swann	and	the	Era	of	Busing	In	July	of	1957,	Charlotte,	Greensboro,	and	Winston-Salem	announced	that	they	had	granted	transfer	requests	for	12	Black	students.	Under	state	and	local	law,	Black	students	who	wished	to	attend	a	White	school	to	which	they	were	not	assigned	were	required	to	follow	a	convoluted	administrative	appeals	process.	When	granting	five	of	the	twelve	transfer	requests,	the	Charlotte	School	Board	defended	its	decision	as	a	step	to	“preserve	the	public	schools	of	Charlotte”	–	token	desegregation	hedging	against	outright,	court-ordered	integration.		Then,	in	July	of	1960,	what	had	once	been	four	school	districts	–	Mecklenburg	County	schools,	divided	between	White	and	Black,	and	Charlotte	City	schools,	also	divided	between	White	and	Black,	were	consolidated.	The	merger	joined	the	city	and	county	districts	into,	ostensibly,	one	district,	serving	both	Black	and	White	students.	Under	superintendent	Craig	Phillips,	the	new	district	took	advantage	of	the	autonomy	recently	granted	by	the	state	on	matters	of	pupil	assignment.	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Schools	(CMS)	organized	itself	around	a	policy	of	geographic	zoning	and	“freedom	of	transfer.”	Under	this	system,	students	attended	schools	based	on	where	they	lived	–so-called	neighborhood	schools–	but,	if	they	preferred	to	attend	another	school,	either	seeking	or	fleeing	integration,	they	could	request	the	transfer,	so	long	as	the	school	had	room	for	the	students	(Gaillard,	66).	Ten	all-Black	schools	remained	such;	they	were	omitted	from	the	new	zoning	plan	pending	the	completion	of	a	30	million-dollar	school	construction	project	(Gaillard,	66;	Douglas,	117).	On	paper,	the	school	board	complied	with	the	orders	of	Brown;	students	were	no	longer	assigned	by	race.	In	practice,	student	assignment	based	on	location	instead	
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of	race	perpetuated	a	“dual	system”	of	segregated	White	and	Black	schools.	A	result	of	historic	access	to	economic	opportunity,	federal	state	and	municipal	housing	regulations,	redlining,	development,	and	zoning	ordinances,	Mecklenburg	County	was	deeply	segregated,	with	most	Black	residents	clustered	in	the	northwest	quadrant	of	Charlotte,	just	beyond	the	city	center.	As	a	result,	most	Black	students	attended	schools	that	were	all	Black	or	nearly,	and	most	White	students	attended	schools	that	were	all	White	or	nearly	so.		This	was	the	North	Carolina	strategy,	executed	in	Mecklenburg	County.	The	school	system	complied	with	the	court	order	to	desegregate	while	doing	everything	in	its	power	to	do	so	slowly.		One	of	the	problems	with	‘freedom	of	choice’	and	‘freedom	of	transfer’	was	that	Black	families	tended	to	be	poor	and	unable	to	provide	transportation	for	their	children	if	they	requested	a	transfer	from	a	segregated	Black	school	to	a	segregated	White	school	or	integrated	school	(Swann,	1969).		While	Swann	v	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Board	of	Education	is	often	remembered	as	“the	busing	case,”	in	which	the	federal	courts	required	CMS	to	eliminate	the	legacy	of	segregated	schools	by	busing	students	within	the	county	so	that	despite	the	county’s	segregated	neighborhoods,	the	school	racial	composition	approximated	the	overall	demographics	of	the	school	system.	However,	well	before	Judge	McMillan	offered	busing	as	a	tool	for	desegregation,	busing	was	already	in	use	–	to	maintain	segregation	in	Mecklenburg	County.	In	Morrow	v.	Mecklenburg	County	Board	of	Education,	the	families	of	8	Black	children	in	Mecklenburg	county	sued	to	be	allowed	to	send	their	children	to	a	nearby	White	school,	instead	of	busing	them	“nine	to	eleven	miles”	to	an	all-Black	school.	(Morrow).		
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	In	September	of	1957,	two	Presbyterian	missionaries	followed	the	news	of	the	first	attempts	to	integrate	the	public	schools	in	Charlotte,	North	Carolina.	In	one	photo	from	a	US	newspaper,	Darius	and	Vera	Swann,	Black	themselves,	admired	the	poise	with	which	a	young	Black	woman	carried	herself	through	a	jeering,	spitting	crowd	of	White	students	on	her	way	to	be	the	first	Black	student	to	register	for	classes	at	Central	High	School.	Dorothy	Counts	was	her	name;	she	had	been	the	flower	girl	at	the	Swann’s	wedding.	Her	father,	Herman	Swann,	had	been	the	pastor	of	Darius’	childhood	congregation	in	Amelia	County,	Virginia	and	had	taught	the	Swanns	when	they	studied	at	Johnson	C.	Smith	in	Charlotte	(Douglas,	111).	Nearly	ten	years	later,	in	1965,	Darius	and	Vera	Swann	would	also	challenge	segregation	within	CMS.	After	eleven	years	in	India,	they	had	returned	to	Charlotte,	where	the	school	board	assigned	their	son	James	not	to	the	nearby,	integrated	Seversville	Elementary	but	instead	to	all-Black	Biddleville	Elementary.	After	a	personal	meeting	with	Superintendent	Phillips	proved	fruitless,	the	Swanns,	rather	than	file	a	transfer	appeal	under	the	school	board’s	new	plan	(a	plan	that	followed	state’s	Pearsall	Plan’s	transfer	request	policy	–	an	“evil”	system,	they	said)	they	sued	the	district	(Douglas,	111).	A	young	lawyer	named	Julius	Chambers	filed	the	suit.	Three	years	removed	from	law	school,	Chambers	had	moved	to	Charlotte	the	year	before.	Empowered	by	the	NAACP’s	Legal	Defense	Fund	(for	whom,	under	Thurgood	Marshall,	Chambers	was	the	first	intern),	in	his	first	year,	Chambers	had	filed	fifty-five	desegregation	cases	against	the	state	of	North	Carolina,	thirty-five	challenging	school	segregation	and	twenty	addressing	public	accommodations	(Stein).		
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Faced	with	a	lawsuit,	the	school	board	allowed	James	Swann	to	attend	Seversville	Elementary	school,	experiencing	the	desegregated	experience	to	which,	his	parents	claimed,	he	had	become	accustomed	in	India.	The	case,	however,	was	dismissed.	District	Court	Judge	Braxton	Craven	ruled	that	the	school	district’s	desegregation	plan	was	constitutional.	Two	years	later,	the	Swanns	left	Charlotte,	but	the	case	bearing	their	son’s	name	remained	(Douglas,	111;	Gaillard,	68).		Craven’s	decision	against	Swann	and	Chambers	brought	school	desegregation	litigation	in	Mecklenburg	County	to	a	halt.	A	growing	body	of	new	case	law	inspired	by	the	Brown	decision	supported	arguments	like	those	that	Chambers	had	made	–	that	desegregation	was	not	complete	if	a	school	district	simply	drew	school	assignment	borders	around	black	neighborhoods	and	called	it	race-neutral	geographic	assignment.	Craven	later	claimed	that,	given	the	lack	of	clear	alternative,	his	was	the	only	decision	possible.	Chambers’	expert	witness,	Craven	said,	“was	commendably	candid	in	stating	that	he	had	not	spent	enough	time	to	be	able	to	recommend	generally	a	new	and	better	zoning	pattern.	If	[he],	competent	and	experienced	in	the	field	of	education,	does	not	feel	able	to	intelligently	alter	the	general	zoning	pattern,	it	seems	unlikely	to	me	that	a	District	Judge	could	intelligently	do	so	based	on	information	made	available	to	him	in	only	a	day	and	a	half	[of	testimony]”	(Douglas,	117).	Four	short	years	later,	Chambers	would	find	a	witness	–and	a	judge–	willing	to	do	just	that.	In	1968	the	Supreme	Court	heard	another	school	desegregation	case,	this	one	from	New	Kent	County,	Virginia.	The	school	system	maintained	two	high	schools	on	opposite	ends	of	the	county.	No	clear	racialized	housing	pattern	existed	in	the	county,	but	the	two	
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schools	remained	racially	segregated.	In	response	to	the	Supreme	Court’s	desegregation	mandate,	Virginia	had	returned	school	assignment	policy	to	the	state.	In	first	and	eighth	grade,	students	chose	the	school	they	wished	to	attend,	and	the	state	dutifully	re-enrolled	them	in	that	same	school	each	subsequent	year.	In	the	decision,	the	Court	wrote,	“During	the	plan's	three	years	of	operation,	no	white	student	has	chosen	to	attend	the	all-Negro	school,	and	although	115	Negro	pupils	enrolled	in	the	formerly	all-white	school,	85%	of	the	Negro	students	in	the	system	still	attend	the	all-Negro	school”	(Green	v	New	Kent	County).		The	Supreme	Court	ruled	that,	in	desegregating	their	schools,	school	boards	should	not	only	remove	previous,	racially	discriminatory	policy,	but	also	take	an	active	role	in	ending	the	vestiges	of	segregation	in	the	schools.	The	school	boards	had	an	“affirmative	duty	to	
take	whatever	steps	might	be	necessary	to	convert	to	a	unitary	system	in	which	racial	
discrimination	would	be	eliminated	root	and	branch”	(Green).	The	remnants	of	purposeful	
segregation	needed	to	be	eliminated	in	six	areas,	which	later	became	known	as	the	“Green	
Factors:”	student	assignment,	faculty	assignment,	staff	assignment,	transportation,	extracurricular	activities,	and	facilities	(Green).	Revived	by	the	1969	Green	ruling	and	their	belief	that	the	courts	should	reconsider	the	Charlotte	case,	Julius	Chambers	and	his	law	partners	pressed	on.	They	drafted	a	motion	to	reopen	the	case,	and	prepared	their	argument	for	the	newly	appointed	District	Court	Judge,	Jim	McMillan.	Based	on	their	knowledge	of	McMillan	as	a	person,	the	attorneys	felt	they	could	persuade	him	that	busing	was	a	good	idea	–	even	though,	as	a	citizen,	he	had	demonstrated	that	thought	it	was	not:	addressing	the	North	Carolina	Law	Review	Association	in	1963,	McMillan	said,	“School	boards	should	be	encouraged	rather	than	discouraged	to	draw	
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school	districts	and	make	pupil	assignments	without	substantial	regard	to	race.	At	the	same	time,	may	we	forever	be	saved	from	the	folly	of	the	New	York	authorities	who	have	reportedly	gone	to	the	wild	extreme	of	requiring	that	pupils	be	transported	far	away	from	their	natural	habitat	so	that	some	artificial	“average”	of	racial	balance	might	be	maintained”	(Douglas,	133).	But	McMillan	had	also	supported	the	integration	of	the	North	Carolina	Bar,	and	Chambers	had	a	favorable	impression	of	him	from	their	work	together	with	NC	Legal	Services,	helping	providing	legal	representation	to	those	who	could	not	afford	it	(Stein).	Over	days	of	testimony,	education	experts	presented	evidence	of	the	benefits	of	desegregation	to	Black	students,	and	the	egregious	harm	caused	by	‘separate	but	equal’	schools.	McMillan	“became	aware	of	the	terribleness”	(Stein).	The	attorneys	showed	McMillan	that	while	schools	in	the	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	system	were	no	longer	divided	between	white	and	black	by	legal,	‘de	jure’	segregation,	they	remained	segregated	by	‘de	facto’	segregation.	Most	all	Black	students	lived	in	one	poor,	Black	part	of	the	town,	while	most	white	students	lived	in	another	part	of	town	–	the	wealthiest	of	these	also	clustered	together.		By	1969	not	all	CMS	schools	were	strictly	segregated.	Olympic	High	School,	for	example,	out	past	the	airport	in	the	southwest	corner	of	the	county,	was	about	1/3	Black	and	2/3	White.		Sill,	thousands	of	students	still	attended	schools	–	elementary,	middle	and	high	–	in	which	all	of	the	students	were	of	the	same	race	(Swann.	For	further	elaboration,	Figure	1,	and	pertinent	discussion	in	the	section	on	“Schooling,	Housing,	and	Demography,”	beginning	on	page	37).		Geographic	Assignment	and	‘de	facto’	segregation	
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The	new	school	choice	plan	did	not	encourage	desegregation,	and	as	it	hinged	on	neighborhood-by-neighborhood	“geographic	assignment,”	it	only	doubled	down	on	segregated	housing	patterns.	De	facto	segregation,	segregation	by	individual	preference,	was	not	driving	the	continued	school	segregation.	Housing	patterns	reflected	the	legacy	of	
de	jure	segregation,	segregation	imposed	by	law.	Housing	had	been	forcibly	segregated,	Chambers	argued,	not	only	by	personal	taste	or	animus,	but	also	by	federal	and	state	policy	that	drove	urban	renewal	projects	and	affordable	housing	placement,	and	state	laws	that	upheld	racially	exclusive	homeowner	covenants.	Not	only	was	the	school	board	not	taking	enough	action	to	address	these	historic	factors,	but	their	continued	existence	was	causing	Black	students	and	the	Black	community	to	suffer	tremendous	consequences;	the	situation	needed	to	be	fixed.	From	a	file	of	evidence	and	exhibits	“about	two	and	one-half	feet	thick,”	which	“required	considerable	study,”	McMillan	found	that	he	was	inclined	to	agree	with	Chambers	and	Stein.	“The	system	of	assigning	pupils	by	‘neighborhoods,’	with	‘freedom	of	choice’	for	both	pupils	and	faculty,	superimposed	on	an	urban	population	pattern	where	Negro	residents	have	become	concentrated	almost	entirely	in	one	quadrant	of	a	city	of	270,000	is	racially	discriminatory…The	neighborhood	school	concept,”	McMillan	continued,	“never	prevented	statutory	racial	segregation;	it	may	not	now	be	validly	used	to	perpetuate	segregation”	(Swann,	1969).	“All	we	decide	today	is	that	in	desegregating	a	dual	system	a	plan	utilizing	‘freedom	of	choice’	is	not	an	end	in	itself”	(Swann,	1969).	Building	off	of	the	Green	decision,	Judge	McMillan	continued,	concluding	that,	“The	duty	now	appears	as	not	simply	a	negative	duty	to	refrain	from	active	legal	racial	
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discrimination,	but	a	duty	to	act	positively	to	fashion	affirmatively	a	school	system	as	free	as	possible	from	the	lasting	effects	of	such	historical	apartheid”	(Swann).	Chambers	and	company	knew	they	needed	to	come	up	with	a	plan	that	did	the	most	to	fashion	such	a	system.	They	contacted	education	experts	from	around	the	country,	including	a	team	led	by	Dr.	John	Finger	of	Rhode	Island	College.	Finger	drew	a	new	geographic	school	assignment	plan	that	divided	the	city	center	into	radial	assignment	zones	–	something	the	school	board	was	trending	towards,	creating	high	schools	and	junior	high	schools	with	racial	proportions	approximating	those	of	the	city	–and	but	he	also,	in	order	to,	as	directed,	make	as	many	schools	as	possible	as	close	as	possible,	racially,	to	Charlotte’s	71/29%	White	to	Black	ratio,	bussed	pockets	of	students	around	the	county,	far	from	their	homes.	In	addition,	Dr.	Finger	paired	together	Black	and	White	elementary	schools,	busing	Black	children	into	white	neighborhoods	for	grades	1-4,	and	busing	the	white	students	back	into	the	Black	neighborhoods	for	grades	5	and	6	(Swann,	1969)	The	CMS	School	Board	strongly	opposed	the	Finger	Plan	and	attempted	to	create	their	own	plan	for	desegregatin,	but	McMillan	repeatedly	rejected	their	counter	proposals,	finding	them	insufficient.			In	1969	Stein	drafted	a	brief,	based	on	a	new	case	out	of	Mississippi,	asking	McMillan	to	demand	the	board	put	forth	a	plan	to	be	implemented	that	spring	before	the	end	of	the	school	year.	The	city	erupted	and,	with	Stein	and	other	lawyers	from	the	LDF	drawing	briefs,	drawing	motions	and	taking	depositions	and	Chambers	putting	on	the	finishing	touches	and	delivering	the	oral	arguments,	they	fought	all	the	way	to	the	supreme	court,	Chambers	performing	a	“beautiful”	oral	argument	on	October	12,	1970	(Stein).	
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By	then,	Finger’s	busing	plan	had	already	begun	–	on	August	7,	McMillan	had	responded	in	the	affirmative	to	an	Appellate	Court	order	that	he	reexamine	the	‘reasonableness’	of	his	decision.	He	found	his	decision	to	be	quite	reasonable,	and	ordered	the	school	board	to	abide	by	the	Finger	Plan	unless	they	were	able	to	produce	a	suitable	substitute.		The	school	board	appealed	to	the	Supreme	Court,	and	requested	that	Chief	Justice	Burger	stay	the	implementation	of	the	busing	plan	until	the	case	was	decided,	but	on	August	25,	Burger	shocked	the	county,	replying	that	it	was	the	duty	of	the	district	to	proceed	under	McMillan’s	orders	until	the	higher	court	released	their	decision	(Gaillard,	97).	In	February	of	the	following	year,	the	Court	ruled	with	McMillan	and	Chambers;	the	Finger	plan	was	there	to	stay,	as	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools	would	remain	under	court	order	until	they	achieved	unitary	status,	eliminating	all	vestiges	of	the	former	dual	system.	Though	Judge	McMillan	ruled	strongly	in	favor	of	the	plaintiffs,	in	closing	the	case	he	left	CMS	under	court	order	but	not	court	supervision.	This	affirmation	of	good	faith	in	the	school	board	returned	some	of	their	autonomy,	but	restricted	the	ability	of	a	third	party	to	monitor	CMS.	In	order	to	challenge	any	action	taken	by	the	school	district,	a	plaintiff	would	need	to	either	motion	to	reopen	the	Swann	case,	or	open	a	new	lawsuit	against	CMS.	Three	decades	later,	both	would	happen.			The	School	Board,	Housing,	and	the	Politics	of	Development		In	1978,	with	effusive	support	from	the	School	Board,	Charlotte	broke	ground	on	a	scattered-site	public	housing	project.	Prompted	in	part	by	Julius	Chambers	and	a	hard-won	federal	judge,	the	series	of	developments	were	intended	to	make	the	project	of	school	desegregation	an	easier	one	by	reducing	the	concentration	of	subsidized	public	housing.	
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Intended	to	disperse	clusters	of	poor	Charlotteans	and	the	Black	families	who	disproportionately	qualified	for	housing	support,	the	project	was	a	successful	complement	to	the	busing	plan.	Unfortunately,	until	a	1994	report	commissioned	by	it	was	the	only	significant	attempt	by	the	city	or	county	to	coordinate	public	housing	and	development	policies	with	the	school	district’s	desegregation	effort	(Smith,	217	&	224).	The	1994	report	counseled	that	desegregation	of	the	schools	would	continue	to	be	an	uphill	battle	until	segregated	housing	patterns	were	addressed	systematically	from	a	policy	perspective.	Commissioned	by	then-Board	Chair	Arthur	Griffin,	the	report	recommended	“the	use	of	regulatory	techniques	and	incentive	programs	such	as	inclusionary	zoning,	linkage	ordinances,	density	bonuses,	and	low	interest	loans”	(Smith,	224).	It	earned	heavy	criticism	from	the	community,	and	Mayor	Richard	Vinroot	derisively	dismissed	the	report	as	“social	engineering,”	calling	the	suggested	Affordable	Housing	Task	Force	“unnecessary”	(Smith,	224).	Every	year	after	1974,	the	school	board	reviewed	the	busing	plan,	and,	nearly	every	year,	made	minor	changes,	tweaking	the	pupil	assignment	areas,	drawing	new	busing	routes.	These	tweaks	were	made	in	order	to	attempt	to	orchestrate	the	racial	composition	of	the	various	student	bodies	so	that	they	fell	within	15%	of	the	racial	composition	of	the	entire	school	system.	If	CMS	had	been	50%	White,	for	example,	each	school	could	have	been	no	less	than	35%	White	and	no	more	than	65%.	The	yearly	adjustments	were	necessary;	Mecklenburg	County’s	demography	was	steadily	changing,	and	the	population	would	soon	soar.	Given	the	nature	of	CMS’	busing	plan	and	the	yearly	adjustments	made	by	the	school	board,	where	a	family	chose	to	live	within	Mecklenburg	County	had	little	bearing	on	the	caliber	or	racial	makeup	of	the	schools	their	children	might	attend	(Liebowitz	and	
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Page,	674).	Some	White	families	took	advantage	of	a	policy	allowing	integrated	neighborhoods	to	attend	their	“neighborhood”	(closest)	school,	and	residential	segregation	rates	declined-	somewhat.	New	White	arrivals,	in	particular,	abjured	the	desegregating	neighborhoods	of	the	city,	and	followed	developers	to	the	suburbs,	testing	the	limits	of	the	busing	system.	Ten	years	after	Chambers’	housing	suit	Charlotte	elected	Harvey	Gantt	mayor.	Trained	as	an	urban	planner,	Gantt	was	the	first	Black	student	to	graduate	to	study	at	Clemson	University,	and	went	on	to	earn	a	masters	from	MIT	(Smith,	23).	In	electing	Gantt,	Charlotte	made	history.	Twenty-six	years	after	threats	and	antagonism	drove	Dorothy	Counts	to	withdraw	from	Charlotte’s	Central	High	School,	Charlotte	became	the	first	large,	majority	White,	Southern	city	to	elect	a	Black	mayor.	Gantt	relied	heavily	on	support	from	the	White	business	elite,	and	polled	well	with	Black	voters	and	many	White	voters,	particularly	wealthy	Whites	(Smith,	43).	In	his	two	terms	as	mayor,	Gantt	presided	over	continued	growth	–	both	within	and	beyond	the	city	limits,	as	many	newcomers	settled	in	new	suburban	housing	developments.	The	city	grew	quickly	under	Gantt.	The	mayor	directed	the	annexation	of	many	of	the	new	suburbs,	even	as	he	attempted,	unsuccessfully,	to	enact	policies	that	would	discourage	growth	so	far	from	the	city.	Charlotte’s	annexation	strategy	revealed	one	key	thing	about	growth	in	Mecklenburg	County:	conservative,	white	transplants	inhabited	most	of	the	suburbs	Gantt	annexed	during	his	time	as	mayor.	Favoring	a	far	more	conservative	(and	White)	candidate,	the	suburbs	proved	key	players	in	voting	Gantt	out	of	office	in	1987,	despite	his	overwhelming	support	amongst	the	White	business	community	(Smith,	44).	The	suburban	
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concentration	of	the	new	residents	compounded	the	racial	isolation	within	the	county	as	the	affluent	White	population	moved	further	and	further	to	the	periphery,	expecting	the	local	governments,	including	CMS,	to	accommodate	their	housing	choices.	However,	due	to	the	successful	execution	of	the	Finger	Plan-style	busing	plan,	schooling	quality	and	student	body	demographics	were	relatively	even	throughout	CMS	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	674).	Liebowitz	and	Page	(2015)	argue	that	when	White	families	selected	housing,	proximity	to	certain	public	schools,	at	least,	was	not	a	high	priority.	Still,	Whites	–who	in	Mecklenburg	County	were	and	are	much	more	able	and	likely	than	Blacks	to	own	their	home	(Smith,	46-55)–	flocked	to	the	suburbs.	Homeowners	and	developers	alike	dismissed	or	overlooked	rising	concerns	that	the	concentration	of	Whites	in	southeastern,	suburban	Mecklenburg	(Smith,	95).		In	response	to	the	growth,	CMS	constructed	new,	suburban	schools.		Desegregation	rates	began	to	slip,	as	CMS	was	forced	to	bus	Black	students	further	and	further	from	home	in	an	attempt	to	counteract	the	nearly	homogenous	southeastern	quadrant	of	the	county.	Many	of	the	suburban	transplants	were	used	to	the	fragmented	school	districts	that	characterized	most	other	urban	areas	in	the	U.S.	at	the	time.	They	thought	that	by	buying	a	home	in	a	wealthy,	White	suburb	would	ensure	their	child	attended	a	Wealthy,	white,	locally-financed	and	governed	school,	not	ensure	that	they	were	bused	into	Charlotte	to	maintain	a	racial	balance.	The	late	80’s	saw	a	torrent	of	discontent	with	the	busing	policy,	leading	the	Board	to	hire	Jim	Murphy	as	superintendent	in	1991	(Smith,	102).	Murphy	had	recently	worked	as	superintendent	in	Prince	George’s	county,	championing	a	program	of	magnet	schools	as	a	substitute	for	“forced”	desegregation.		The	hiring	of	Superintendent	Jim	Murphy	and	implementation	of	his	“A	New	Generation	of	Excellence”	magnet	school	plan,	however,	moved	closer	to	the	previous	
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linkage	between	neighborhood	and	school,	and	schools	began	to	be	more	clearly	differentiable	racially,	and	academically.	The	plan	called	for	a	phasing	out	the	pairing	elementary	schools	from	White	and	Black	neighborhoods	and	ended	most	mandatory	busing.	The	main	focus	of	his	plan	centered	on	the	creation	of	magnet	schools.		To	encourage	White,	suburban	families	to	continue	busing	their	children	back	into	the	increasingly	non-White	city,	Murphy	directed	CMS	to	create	a	series	of	magnet	schools	with	special	themed	academic	programs,	including	specialties	in	the	arts,	foreign	languages,	and	STEM.	The	schools	were	intended	to	encourage	(most	White)	parents	skeptical	of	the	mandatory	busing	policies	to	choose	to	send	their	children	to	desegregated	magnet	schools	(Smith,	112)	The	magnet	schools	maintained	stringent	racial	quotas,	but	the	plan	included	no	method	for	maintaining	racial	balances	in	the	schools	that	lost	population	to	the	magnet	schools.	The	new	program	quickly	led	to	a	re-emergence	of	racial	separation	between	schools	in	CMS.	The	use	of	racial	quotas	in	the	magnet	programs	would	be	found	unconstitutional	in	Paul	Capacchione’s	lawsuit	Capacchione	v.	CMS,	the	case	which	lead	Judge	Potter	to	declare	that	CMS	had	achieved	unitary	status	and	that	a	race-based	busing	program	was	no	longer	mandated.	This	decision	would	set	of	a	string	of	changes	felt	throughout	the	community,	and	sharpen	the	connection	between	schools	and	housing.		 	
40	 	
Interest	Divergence	and	the	Preservation	of	Whiteness	Housing	Segregation	Just	as	the	busing	plans	of	1969	and	1974	did	not	elicit	mass	population	transfers	to	the	degree	that	critics	prophesied,	the	housing	changes	post-2002	have	been	subtle.	For	desegregation	proponents,	the	changes,	though	subtle,	have	also	been	insidious.		An	analysis	of	these	changes	will	help	to	characterize	the	relationship	between	racial	segregation	in	housing	and	in	education	environments,	and	provide	some	perspective	on	the	variety	of	actions	Charlotte	and	Mecklenburg	County	and	CMS	might	take	looking	to	the	future.		While	in	the	mid	1980’s	CMS	nearly	eliminated	all	court-identified	evidence	of	segregated	schools,	by	the	1990’s,	more	and	more	racially	identifiable	schools	emerged	(Mickelson	2005,	p.	99).	Housing	data	suggests	that	Charlotte-	area	neighborhoods	became	less	racially	segregated	in	the	decades	under	the	race-based	busing	plan	(Frankenberg	177).	 Current	housing	data	indicates	that	White	families	who	move	within	Mecklenburg	County	are	more	attentive	to	the	racial	composition	of	their	neighborhoods	than	in	the	preceding	decades,	during	the	era	of	court-ordered	desegregation	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	2014).	Contemporary,	White	movers	select	for	increasingly	White	neighborhoods.	The	Convergence	of	No	Child	Left	Behind1	(NCLB)	and	the	dismantling	of	CMS’s	race-based	
																																																								1	NCLB	standardized	a	CMS	practice	instituted	under	superintendent	Jim	Murphy,	that	of	issuing	yearly	“report	cards”	for	each	school.	Billings,	Brunner,	and	Ross	(2013)	suggest	that	the	availability	of	this	data	increased	homebuyers’	attentiveness	to	local	school	quality.	The	authors	also	argue	that	the	availability	of	report	cards	under	Murphy	means	that	NCLB	did	not	immediately	influence	the	housing	choices	of	parents;	they	merely	note	that	NCLB	passed	in	the	same	year	that	housing	choices	began	to	directly	correspond	to	school	assignment.	After	2001,	Mecklenburg	County	parents	buying	homes	could	evaluate,	based	on	the	NCLB	report	card	standards,	the	relative	quality	of	the	schools	to	which	their	home	purchase	would	correspond.		
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pupil	assignment	program	has	further	effected	home	values	in	Charlotte,	in	ways	that	are	at	times	predictable	and	at	others	surprising	(Billings,	Brunner,	and	Ross,	2013).	Little	existing	research	has	demonstrated,	or	focused	on	emphasizing,	a	direct	connection	between	home	values	and	school	reputation.	However,	news	media	reporting	on	the	colloquially-termed	“Cotswold	Rebellion,”	wherein	White	parents	in	southern	Charlotte	challenged	their	children’s	reassignment	to	a	less-wealthy,	less-white	middle	and	high	school,	points	to	a	strong	connection	between	perception	of	home	value	and	school	quality.		Segregation:	Schooling,	Housing,	and	Demography	The	geographic	assignment	policy	adopted	after	CMS’	1960	consolidation	largely	maintained	the	dual	school	system.	Almost	all	White	students	went	to	schools	which	were	attended	nearly	exclusively	by	White	students	and	staffed	by	White	teachers	and	administrators	and	almost	all	Black	students	attended	schools	which	were	attended	nearly	exclusively	by	Black	students	and	staffed	by	Black	teachers	and	administrators	(Grundy,	39).	Desegregation	was	a	long	and	difficult	journey	–	a	winding	path,	whose	conflicts	never	quite	ended.	In	Figure	one	graphs	Liebowitz	and	Page’s	2014	demonstration	of	the	volatility	of	segregation	in	CMS.	Those	changes,	in	part,	tell	the	story	of	desegregation.	Figure	one	demonstrates	a	segregation	index	based	on	dissimilarity.	The	
Dissimilarity	Index	is	an	index,	0-1,	based	on	the	percentage	of	Black	students	who	would	need	to	move	in	order	to	make	the	surveyed	area	desegregated.	It	is	frequently	used	as	a	measure	of	segregation	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	276).	Figure	one	measures	the	ratio	of	non-White	students	who	would	need	to	be	moved	to	a	different	school	to	achieve	an	even	school-system-wide	distribution	of	pupils	by	students’	race.	
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Figure	1:	Segregation index in Charlotte–Mecklenburg Schools, 1950–2010 (Liebowitz and Page, 676) 
	Reproduced	from	Liebowitz	and	Page,	2014	(page	676).	Annotations	by	author.	Original	note	by	Liebowitz	and	Page	as	follows:		“1950–2003	reproduced	from	Clotfelter	(2004).	2003–2010	based	on	authors’	calculations	from	CMS	administrative	data.	Authors’	calculations	are	.02	units	higher	for	the	2002–2003	school	year	than	Clotfelter’s.	The	increase	between	2003	and	2004	is,	therefore,	likely	over-	stated	by	about	.02	units.” Figure	one	illustrates	the	great	effects	court	decisions	and	policy	changes	have	had	on	the	rate	of	school-level	desegregation	in	CMS.	As	annotated:	1. Schools	in	Mecklenburg	County	are	fully	segregated.	The	1955	Supreme	Court	order	to	desegregate	with	“all	deliberate	speed”	has	no	immediate	effect.		2. In	1957,	Dorothy	Counts,	Delores	Huntley,	Girvaud	Roberts	and	Gus	Roberts,	Black	students	in	CMS,	attempted	to	enroll	in	White	schools.	3. The	system	awaits	the	outcome	of	the	1969	Swann	case.		4. 1971.	McMillan’s	ruling	is	upheld.	CMS	is	obliged	to	desegregate	immediately,	following	the	“Finger	Plan”.	5. The	slow	climb	in	dissimilarity	following	1974	captures	Judge	McMillan’s	acceptance	of	the	alternate	busing	plan	put	forward	by	the	Citizens	Advisory	Group.		
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6. Dissimilarity	levels	remain	very	low,	though	a	steady	climb	reflects	the	swell	suburban,	White	population	in	southeastern	Charlotte.	Increasing	dissimilarity	into	the	1990’s	is	attributed	to	the	adoption	of	Murphy’s	magnet	school	program.	7. CMS	is	declared	unitary	and	all	mandatory	busing	for	racial	balance	stops.	Under	the	“Family	Choice	Plan,”	students	receive	first	preference	to	attend	the	school	nearest	them.	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	673).	8. Dissimilarity	index	continues	to	climb,	approaching	.4.	A	school-level	dissimilarity	index	approaching	.4	fits	well	with	Liebowitz	and	Page’s	other	finding,	that	residential	segregation	was	little	effected	by	the	unitary	status	decision	and	hovered	just	below	.4	(Figure	2).	Comparing	figures	two	and	one	shows	that,	despite	persistent	residential	segregation,	the	race-based	busing	for	desegregation	created	schools	that	were	far	less	segregated	than	the	communities	they	served.		Figure	2:		
Residential segregation index in CMS for White families and non-White families with elementary school 
students using 2001–2002 boundaries, by year (2000–2007) (Liebowitz and Page, 683) 
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		 Figure	3	reinforces	this	observation.	1990	Mecklenburg	County	exhibited	a	low	rate	of	segregation	–	less	than	.1	on	the	dissimilarity	index,	despite	a	residential	rate	of	dissimilarity	of	over	40%.	Since	1990,	the	housing	dissimilarity	index	has	diminished	somewhat	but,	as	Figure	1	shows,	between-school	dissimilarity	has	increased	significantly.			Figure	3:		Relationship	between	Residential	and	Public	School	White-Black	segregation.	All	Counties	in	Southern	Metropolitan	Areas,	by	Size	of	County	Black	Population,	1990	(Reardon	and	Yun,	2005)	
		 Nelson,	Mickelson,	and	Smith	(2015)	present	a	different	analysis	of	the	dissimilarity	index	in	CMS	(Figure	4).	Their	data	tell	a	slightly	different	story	than	that	of	Liebowitz	and	Page,	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	their	sample	rate	is	lower,	so	the	graph	captures	fewer	of	the	intra-decadal	shifts	in	dissimilarity.	Secondly,	Nelson,	Mickelson,	and	Smith	construct	their	
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dissimilarity	index	from	kindergarten	data.	Liebowitz	and	Page	aggregate	the	data	of	every	school	in	CMS.	Under	the	feeder	organization	that	has	been	in	place	since	the	Finger	Plan,	elementary	schools	zones	aggregate	into	middle	school	zones,	which	aggregate	into	high	school	zones.	Under	this	system,	two	elementary	schools,	one	90%	Black	and	the	other	90%	White,	can	feed	into	the	same	middle	school,	creating	a	middle	school	with	a	very	low	dissimilarity	index	score.	By	focusing	on	elementary	schools,	Nelson,	Mickelson,	and	Smith	show	that	recent	changes	have	not	only	blunted	the	success	of	desegregation,	but	also	led	to	the	resegregation	of	many	schools	in	CMS,	with	levels	of	dissimilarity	approaching	those	found	before	Swann.	Their	research	captures	the	most	acute	effects	of	this	resegregation:	students	siloed	into	racially	identifiable	schools	for	the	first	six	years	of	their	education,	a	phenomena	that	Mickelson	(2001)	has	showed	to	have	very	negative	outcomes	on	short-	and	long-term	education	achievement,	attainment,	and	employment.		Figure	4:	CMS	school	dissimilarity	index	(Nelson,	Mickelson,	Smith,	2015)	
Original	note:		
Source:	American	Communities	Project	and	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	Schools
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Mickelson,	Nelson,	and	Smith	and	Liebowitz	and	Page	both	show	both	that	school	segregation	rapidly	increased	after	CMS	was	declared	a	unitary	system,	but	also	that	the	trend	began	many	years	earlier.		With	the	formal	end	to	CMS’	race-based	busing	policy	and	a	return	to	geographic	assignment,	many	more	schools	became	racially	identifiable.	Drawing	from	Mickelson	(2005),	Figure	5	tabulates	the	changes	in	the	percentage	of	racially	identifiable	schools	over	a	two-year	period	spanning	Judge	Potter’s	decision	that	CMS	had	reached	unity	status.	For	the	purposes	of	the	table,	schools	are	considered	racially	identifiable	if,	as	under	desegregation	orders,	the	ratio	of	any	racial	demographic	within	the	school	falls	beyond	+/-	15%	of	the	system	wide	average.	In	two	years,	the	end	of	busing	added	22%	of	the	elementary	schools,	7.4%	of	the	middle	schools,	and	20.6%	of	the	high	schools	to	the	ranks	of	schools	which	were,	based	on	the	logic	of	the	last	thirty	years,	now	segregated.	(Mickelson,	2005,	p.	100).		Figure	5:		Changes	in	CMS	racial	demographics	(Mickelson,	2005)	Percent	Change	from	2001/2002	–	2003/2004	school	years		Demographic	 Elementary	 Middle	 High	Racially	Balanced	 -22.6	 -7.4	 -20.6	Racially	identifiable	Black	 +9.0	 +3.0	 +16.6	Racially	identifiable	White	 +11.6	 +4.5	 +4.0		
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The	end	of	the	court	orders	in	2002	did	create	some	marked,	abrupt	fissures	in	the	inter-school	demographics	of	CMS,	but	the	change	was	compounded	by	an	already-begun,	steady	undoing	of	the	height	of	racial	balance	achieved	in	the	1980’s	as	well	as	the	rapidly	changing	demographics	within	Mecklenburg	County.	The	wild	changes	in	the	number	of	racially	imbalanced	schools	between	2001	and	2004	only	added	to	the	thirty	percent	of	the	schools	in	the	126-school	system	that	were	already	racially	imbalanced	(Belk).		In	2000,	the	CMS	student	population	was	47%	white.	Six	percent	of	non-white	students	attended	schools	that	were	at	least	90%	non-White	(Figure	6).	The	following	decade	would	see	the	development	of	more	concentrated-non-White	schools.	In	2010,	CMS	was	33%	White.	Still,	an	even	pupil	distribution	by	race	would	have	left	no	school	more	than	82%	non-White;	more	than	one	third	–thirty-six	percent–	of	the	schools	were	more	than	90%	non-White	(Figure	6).	One	of	the	outcomes	of	the	changing	racial	dispersion	within	CMS	has	been	the	diminishing	of	the	rate	at	which	White	and	Black	students	interact	with	once	another	in	school,	often	called	the	“encounter	rate.”		Encounter	rates	are	measured	by	an	exposure	
index.	In	cases	relating	to	school	desegregation,	this	is	measured	as	the	percentage	of	White	students	composing	the	class	of	an	average	Black	student.	In	the	four	years	from	1968	to	1972,	the	encounter	rate	between	Black	and	White	students	rose	by	thirteen	percent	nationally	(Rossell	and	Armor,	1996).		After	the	Belk	verdict	declared	CMS	a	unitary	district,	the	encounter	rate	fell	by	the	same	margin	(Billings,	Deming,	&	Rockoff,	2013).		Figure	6	demonstrates	how	the	trend	toward	a	greater	number	of	predominately	non-white	schools	began	well	before	the	2002	policy	change.	The	forty	percent	change	in	
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the	percentage	of	Black	students	enrolled	in	majority-minority	schools	stands	out.	Resegregation,	however,	was	not	the	only	factor	at	play.	Figure	6,	Black	students	in	minority	segregated	schools	(Ayscue	&	Woodward,	2014)	(annotations	by	Ayscue	&	Woodward)	
	Between	1990	and	2010,	the	population	of	Mecklenburg	County	grew	by	nearly	eighty	percent,	from	five	hundred	thousand	to	well	over	nine	hundred	thousand	inhabitants..	In	the	same	twenty	years,	the	Black	population	more	than	doubled,	to	nearly	three	hundred	thousand,	the	Asian	population	quadrupled,	to	forty	thousand,	and	the	Latinx	population	grew	by	1,500	percent,	rising	from	six	thousand	people	to	one	hundred	twelve	thousand	–	from	one	percent	to	twelve	percent	(Figure	9).						
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Figure	9.	Population	Change	in	Mecklenburg	County		From:	Plaisance,	Morrell,	McDaniel	(2015)	(p	121)		 1990	 2000	 2010	 %	Growth,	1990-2010	Total	 511,433	 625,454	 919,628	 79.8%	White	 364,651	 445,356	 456,372	 27.1%		 %	of	total	 71%	 64%	 51%	 	Black	 134,468	 192,666	 278,042	 107.7%	%	of	total	 26%	 27%	 31%	 	Asian	 8,481	 20,819	 41,991	 409.9%	%	of	total	 1.6%	 3%	 4.7%	 	Latino	 6,693	 44,871	 111,944	 1572.6%	%	of	total	 1.3%	 6.4%	 12.6%	 			 The	soaring	number	of	Black	and	Latinx	people	in	Mecklenburg	County	dropped	Whites	from	seventy-one	to	fifty-one	percent	of	the	population.	As	of	2014,	Whites	were	no	longer	the	majority	in	Mecklenburg	County.	In	CMS,	the	same	change	had	happened	a	generation	earlier	(Figure	10).	In	2010,	White	students	would	make	up	only	thirty	three	percent	of	the	student	body,	to	Blacks	forty-one.	But	by	2010,	Black	students	in	CMS	had	outnumbered	Whites	for	a	decade	and	a	half.	The	soaring	number	of	Latinx	students	drove	down	whites	share	of	the	pie.	In	2010,	the	number	of	Latinx	children	enrolled	in	CMS	was	
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three	times	the	total	1990	Latinx	population	of	Mecklenburg	County.	Montclaire	Elementary	was	78.9%	Latinx	in	2010.		Figure	10:	CMS	enrollment	by	race	and	ethnicity,	2010-2015	From:	Plaisance,	Morrell,	McDaniel	(2015)	(p	123)		 White	 Black	 Latinx	 Asian	 American	Indian/Multiracial	2010	%	 33	 41	 16	 5	 5	2015*	%	 29.4	 39.7	 22	 6.1	 2.9	Source:	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Schools	Enrollment	Data:	
http://www.cms.k12.nc.us/cmsdepartments/StudentPlacement/PlanningServices/Pages/Enrollmentdata.aspx 	From	a	political	perspective,	however,	the	White	population	in	CMS	remained	a	thorny	issue.	Not	only	was	the	relative	volume	of	White	students	shrinking	–	the	number	of	White	students	enrolled	in	CMS	had	been	in	decline	since	1987.	The	number	of	elementary	school	districts	in	which	fewer	than	twenty	percent	of	the	residents	are	White	residents	is	increasing	rapidly.	The	number	of	elementary	school	zones	that	are	more	than	80%	White	–	once	most	of	the	county	–	are	dwindling	(Figure	7).										
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Figure 7: 2Residential segregation, elementary school pupil assignment zones, 2000-2007 
(Liebowitz and Page, 2015) 
Authors’ Caption: Patterns of high-concentration White and non-White elementary attendance zones, 
using 2001–2002 boundaries. 
  
Figure	eight	shows	how	the	changes	in	neighborhood	demographics	and	the	complete	end	of	CMS’	race-based	desegregation	policy	compounded	to	create	high-poverty,	high-minority	elementary	schools.		The	maps	show	the	impact	of	both	the	end	of	race-based	busing,	and	the	momentum	of	demographic	changes	in	Mecklenburg	County	and	in																																																									2	This	series	of	maps	also	speaks	to	three	demographic	trends	within	Mecklenburg	County.	One	is	the	return	of	White	residents	to	the	city	center	and	immediate	periphery,	evidenced	by	the	>80%	White	elementary	school	zone	that	appears	in	2005.	The	maps	also	evidence	the	growth	of	non-white	suburban	population.	The	final	trend	is	the	overall	browning	of	Mecklenburg	County,	evidenced	by	the	diminishing	number	of	elementary	school	assignment	zones	of	more	than	80%	White	residents.	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	2015)	
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CMS:	increases	in	the	number	and	relative	proportion	of	Black	and	Hispanic	students	in	CMS.		Figure	8:	School	Imbalance:	CMS	Schools	with	over	80%	students	minority	and	80%	students	applied	to	the	federal	free	or	reduced	lunch	program	(Nelson,	2015).	
		The	impact,	in	the	forty	years	since	Swann,	of	the	great	increase	in	the	population	is	matched	only	by	the	incredible	change	of	the	last	twenty	years	in	the	racial	and	ethnic	composition	of	Mecklenburg	County.	It	is	also	worrisome.	Most	desegregation	research,	showing	that	non-White	students	tend	to	do	poorly	in	school	(particularly	in	places	like	Mecklenburg	County	where	non-Whites	tend	to	have	fewer	economic,	educational,	and	employment	opportunities)	has	suggested	mixing	with	White	students	as	the	measured	antidote	for	poor	performance	by	non-White	students	(Mickelson,	2005;	Billings,	.	In	CMS,	there	are	fewer	and	fewer	White	students,	and	the	remaining	White	families	do	not	want	to	participate	in	such	an	experiment.	
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This	tremendous	demographic	change	sets	up	the	background	for	an	explanation	of	why	Charlotte	schools	are	resegregating	at	the	expense	of	non-white	students:	White	families’	school	choices	in	CMS	seem	to	have	always	been	about	their	own	self-interest,	above	all	else.		This	may	seem	natural	–school	choice	does	affect	the	education	of	parents’	children-–	but	the	very	idea	of	school	choice	was	a	phenomenon	that	was	invented	to	deal	with	the	social	challenges	of	desegregation.		Throughout	CMS’	history,	decisions	have	been	made	with	white	parents	and	students	in	mind.	When	parents	found	the	conditions	to	be	unsatisfactory	to	their	needs,	they	took	matters	into	their	own	hands,	by	voting,	by	staging	rallies	–	and	by	moving.	White	families	in	Mecklenburg	County,	as	they	have	since	the	very	beginnings	of	school	desegregation,	concede	to	the	housing	and	educational	needs	of	the	non-White	community	only	so	far	as	it	aligns	with	their	interest.	In	his	interest	convergence	theorem,	Bell	(1980)	argues	that	Whites	will	concede	Black	interests	only	so	long	as	those	interests	align	with	those	of	the	White	community.	It	is	from	this	frame	that	I	will	construct	the	final	piece	of	my	analysis	of	Mecklenburg’s	response	to	school	desegregation.		Housing	Choices	Liebowitz	and	Page	(2014)	found	that	the	declaration	of	unitary	status	and	accompanying	removal	of	race-based	assignment	plans	increased	the	odds	that	White	families	who	move	within	CMS	are	likely	to	move	to	a	neighborhood	that	is	more	White	than	their	current	one.	This	preference	was	so	strong,	the	authors	noted,	that	the	most	likely	intra-county	move	for	a	White	family	with	children	in	CMS	was	into	a	neighborhood	
54	 	
that	was	more	White,	and	was	assigned	to	a	worse	performing	school	than	their	current	neighborhood	(Figure	9).	Liebowitz	and	Page	offer	competing	explanations	for	this	behavior.	Perhaps	a	set	of	movers	prioritized	school	quality,	they	say,	and	the	unitary	status	court	decision	did	not	effect	their	moving.	A	second	group,	however,	prioritized	Whiteness	and	residential	racial	isolation	and	was	better	able	to	secure	that	after	the	unitary	status	declaration.	This	group	account	for	the	increase	in	probability	that	White	families	would	move	into	neighborhoods	that	are	more	White,	but	which	correspond	to	a	poorer-performing	school	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	697).	Their	second	explanation	proposes	that	there	are	White	families	who	move	in	search	of	White	neighborhoods	and	stronger	schools.	However,	only	wealthy	families	are	able	to	secure	both	aims,	so	poorer	White	families	select	only	for	Whiteness	and	not	for	school	quality	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	697).	Both	of	these	explanations,	however,	suggest	that	White	families,	if	they	move	within	Mecklenburg	County,	are	more	likely	to	select	for	whiter	neighborhoods	than	they	were	during	the	desegregation	era	of	1969	to	2002.		Whatever	the	ordinal	preference	for	Whiteness,	be	it	secondary	or	primary,	White	movers	are	likely	to	move	into	an	area	with	poor	schooling	but	many	White	neighbors.	They	do	so	with	5:1	odds,	a	huge	leap	from	the	3:1	odds	that	they	would	do	so	before	the	
Belk	case.						
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Figure	9:	Liebowitz	and	Page,	2014	(p.	694)	Fitted	odds	ratio	of	moving	to	an	elementary	school	zone	that	has	a	greater	proportion	of	White	residents	(for	White	families)	that	the	student’s	current	zone,	by	academic	performance	of	school	within	zone	(1999-2008).	
	Cotswold	Rebellion	In	2009,	the	parents	in	Cotswold,	a	gentrifying	neighborhood	in	southeast	Charlotte,	demonstrated	the	force	with	which	White	families	will	defend	their	carefully	cultivated	White	spaces.	In	September	of	2009	the	CMS	School	Board	held	a	meeting	to	discuss	a	series	of	potential	zoning	changes,	including	diverting	the	“feed”	of	Cotswold	Elementary	from	Alexander	Graham	Middle	School	and	Myers	Park	High	School	(middle	school	
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assignment	areas	are	made	up	of	multiple	elementary	school	zones,	and	high	schools	are	formed	by	joining	several	middle	schools).	Instead	of	attending	the	very	White,	very	affluent,	high	performing	Alexander	Graham	and	the	very	White,	very	affluent,	high	performing	Myers	Park,	Cotswold	Elementary	students	would	attend	McClintock	Middle	and	East	Mecklenburg	High	Schools.		That	year,	hundreds	of	parents	descended	on	a	September	School	Board	meeting	to	protest	a	proposed	change	to	their	children’s	school	assignments.	Cotswold	Elementary	School	lies	midway	between	very	White,	very	wealthy	Alexander	Graham	Middle	School	and	Myers	Park	High	School.	The	school	board	hoped	to	reassign	the	feed	of	the	largely	White	and	affluent	elementary	school	so	that	the	students	could	bring	some	demographic	balance	to	poor	and	non-White	McClintock	Middle	School	and	less-White	East	Mecklenburg	High	School.	A	local	news	article	reported	that,	“[DC	Luchessi]	says	his	objections	aren't	about	his	kids	going	to	East	Meck,	but	what	the	zoning	change	could	undo	at	Cotswold.	"Probably	some	people	would	not	be	okay	with	the	decision	to	disrupt	that	chain.	[They]	would	leave	Cotswold	and	would	disrupt	the	10-year,	12	years	worth	of	work	that	has	gone	on	for	folks	to	turn	that	into	what	should	be	a	model,	but	has	now	turned	into	a	target…”	(Miller).	All	the	school	district	had	wanted	to	do	was	rezone	the	neighborhood	for	a	different	middle	and	high	school.	Under	the	busing	plan,	this	would	have	been	commonplace,	and	with	every	school	averaging	around	sixty	percent	White,	the	White	Cotswold	parents	might	have	agreed	to	the	change.	Instead,	their	structural	advantage	threatened	by	an	action	intended	to	benefit	students	from	a	different	racial	community,	the	parents	showed	up	in	force,	arguing	that	they	had	bought	their	houses	for	a	reason,	and	hoped	to	defend	that	
57	 	
investment.	The	“Cotswold	rebellion”	exemplifies	the	lengths	to	which	White	parents	have	been	willing	to	go	in	order	to	make	certain	that	their	children’s	education	is	shaped	as	the	parents	would	prefer	to	have	it.	As	the	White	population	in	CMS	continues	to	shrink,	social	scientists	continue	to	identify	new	ways	that	White	families	exert	power	to	maintain	their	position	of	social	advantage.		Identifying	a	pattern	that	at	first	glance	seems	to	run	counter	to	Whites’	concern	over	school	assignment	and	their	neighborhoods,	Billings,	Brunner,	and	Ross	(2014)	show	a	surprising	trend:	wealthy,	White	enclaves	zoned	for	CMS	schools	that	fail	the	No	Child	Left	Behind’s	Adequate	Yearly	Progress	Goals	(AYP)	may	see	their	home	values	rise.	First	introduced	in	the	1994	Elementary	and	Secondary	Education	Act,	The	2001	federal	No	Child	Left	Behind	(NCLB)	act	reaffirmed	the	use	of	a	measurement	called	Adequate	Yearly	Progress	(AYP)	as	a	way	to	evaluate	school,	district	and	state	performance	(Editorial	Projects…).	AYP	used	a	variety	of	testing	metrics	to	ascertain	whether	schools	were	making	progress	towards	having	all	students	at	“proficient”	reading	and	math	levels	as	evaluated	by	state	exams.	NCLB	included	a	provision	wherein	students	who	were	enrolled	in	“failing”	schools	(schools	not	meeting	the	AYP	goals)	could	petition	to	attend	a	different	school.	For	CMS,	in	which	the	highest-performing	schools	are	in	high	demand	and	at	or	over	attendance	capacity	(“oversubscribed”),	students	living	in	failing	school	zones	are	given	priority	in	lotteries	to	enter	oversubscribed	schools.	Billings,	Brunner	and	Ross	(2014)	identified	a	peculiar	Mecklenburg	County	trend	around	AYP	goals	and	home	price.	The	authors	found	that	for	wealthy	enclaves	within	what	are	otherwise	poor	school	zones,	home	prices	increase	when	a	school	fails	its	AYP	goals.	Families	who	are	particularly	discerning	about	school	choice	when	making	housing	purchases	can	take	advantage	of	this	
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lottery	boost,	and	move	into	neighborhoods	assigned	to	failing	schools.	Those	who	make	this	move	are	65%	more	likely	to	attend	a	non-assigned	school:	attending	via	the	lottery	system.	The	authors	note	that	CMS	does	allow	students	to	attend	their	previous	school	if	their	family	moves,	but	new	residents	of	the	nicest	areas	within	failing	school	zones	are	28%	more	likely	to	attend	a	new	school	than	are	others	who	move	within	CMS	(Billings,	Brunner,	Ross;	5,	26).	This	action	could	account	for	a	small	part	of	the	portion	of	movers	identified	by	Liebowitz	and	Page	who	move	to	whiter	neighborhoods	regardless	of	school	quality,	but	certainly	not	all	of	it,	given	the	disparate	probabilities	and	volumes	of	moves	addressed	in	the	studies.	The	study	emphasizes	the	consolidation	of	wealth	within	certain	neighborhoods.	It	does	not	detail	the	racial	demography	of	these	moves,	and	wealth	should	not	be	conflated	with	Whiteness,	though	in	Mecklenburg	County,	where	in	1999	the	median	income	was	$72,043	for	Whites,	$39,479	for	Blacks,	and	$36,416	for	Hispanics	living	in	Mecklenburg,	the	two	often	cleave	along	similar	lines.	As	Whites	tend	to	be	more	wealthy,	they	tend	to	be	able	to	be	more	discerning	of	their	housing	choices.	(Liebowitz	and	Page,	680).		 Actions	like	this	are	be	supported	by	theory	about	white	retreat	and	consolidation	in	the	face	of	the	browning	of	cities	like	Charlotte	(Lichter,	Parisi,	Taquino,	2015).	It	seems	that	in	the	case	of	Mecklenburg	County,	the	greatest	value	for	White	families	considering	reproduction	in	society	is	not	that	their	children	attend	high-scoring	schools,	but	that	they	grow	up	in	an	environment	that	is	White,	and	insulates	them	from	non-White	(Lipsitz,	36-37).	School	test	scores	are	(narrowly)	secondary	to	the	maintenance	of	the	structural	advantages	perceived	to	be	afforded	by	the	consolidation	of	Whiteness.		
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White	parents,	concerned	less	with	relative	test	scores	than	their	neighborhood’s	apparent	whiteness,	buy	homes	accordingly.	Neighborhood	schooling	confers	the	confidence	that	even	if	their	White	children	do	not	attend	a	high	achieving	school,	they	do	so	together.			 	
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Conclusion	From	the	beginning	of	school	desegregation,	of	the	dismantling	of	Jim	Crow,	even,	perhaps,	from	the	end	of	Slavery,	ruling	whites	in	Charlotte	supported	changes	which	benefited	non-White	Charlotteans	only	insofar	as	those	changes	were	also	beneficial	to	the	interests	of	ruling	White	elites.	Judge	McMillian’s	ruling	in	Swann,	along	with	John	Finger’s	busing	plan	and	the	compromised	solution	put	forward	the	Citizens	Advisory	Group	were,	after	a	time,	palatable	changes.	Being	known	as	“the	city	that	made	busing	work,”	as	a	face	of	the	New	South,	was	good	for	business	in	Charlotte.	As	business	boomed	and	the	city	sprawled,	though,	one	thing	remained	non-negotiable.	Unwillingness,	on	a	personal	and	political	level,	to	seriously	address	residential	segregation	left	the	post-busing	city	in	a	frustrating	position.	Forced	school	desegregation	had	brought	Charlotte	prestige	on	a	national	scale,	and	Charlotteans	had	bought	into	the	project.	The	return	to	neighborhood	schooling	has	refocused	the	issue.	While	in	1969	residential	segregation	drove	school	segregation,	school	resegregation	now	drives	residential	segregation,	the	two	remaining	in	tandem;	neither	will	be	solved	alone.		Charlotte,	Mecklenburg	County,	and	Charlotte	Mecklenburg	Schools	of	the	1970’s	once	stood	as	an	example	for	the	country,	grappling	–triumphantly,	heroically-	with	a	segregated	city	and	court	orders	to	fix	school	segregation	immediately.	As	Stephen	Smith	(Boom	for	Whom?,	2004)	suggests,	much	of	the	city	and	county’s	growth	and	reputation	can	be	traced	to	civic	pride	about	the	apparent	success	of	busing	for	desegregation.	Today,	as	well,	Charlotte,	Mecklenburg	County,	and	CMS	stand	as	an	example	for	the	country	–	but	it	is	a	different	example.	By	2044,	non-Hispanic	Whites	will	no	longer	comprise	the	majority	of	the	country’s	population,	a	threshold	that	CMS	passed	in	the	late	1990’s,	that	
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Mecklenburg	County	White	dipped	under	in	2014	(Colby	&	Ortman,	2014;	US	Census	Bureau,	2014).		Interest	Divergence		Whites,	once	a	majority	in	the	towns	of	Mecklenburg,	now	find	themselves	outnumbered,	and	a	combination	of	lore,	fear,	and	dedication	to	identity	has	prevented	them	from	embracing	the	true,	minority-driven,	New	South	City.		Mecklenburg	County	also	stands	as	a	powerful,	salient	example	of	the	perils	of	the	interest	convergence	dilemma	as	proposed	by	Bell	and	elaborated	by	Smith.	Even	in	twenty-first	century,	post-desegregation	Mecklenburg,	Whites	find	it	more	desirable	to	live	amongst	themselves	than	to	send	their	children	to	schools	which	are	better	academically	and	statistically	provide	educations	that	are	well-suited	to	support	those	children’s	existence	in	the	society	of	the	future.	That	is	how	it	has	always	worked.	While	desegregation	brought,	for	a	few	years,	the	rate	of	segregation	in	schools	to	close	to	zero,	it	did	not	resolve	residential	segregation,	the	effects	of	which	now	hinder	CMS’s	ability	to	continue	building	positive	schools.	But	for	most	White	families	who	remain	in	CMS	in	increasingly	segregated	and	hyper-segregated	White	schools	or	have	the	means	to	leave	for	a	hyper-segregated	White	charter	school	or	private	school,	residential	seclusion	as	a	method	of	selective	social	inclusion	and	exclusion	remains	integral	to	the	replication	of	the	advantages	afforded	them	by	the	preservation	of	Whiteness.			 	
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